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Abstract 
This paper presents a new empirical approach to address the problem of trading time 
differences between markets in studies of financial contagion. In contrast to end-of-business-
day data common to most contagion studies, we employ price observations, which are exactly 
aligned in time to correct for time-zone and end-of-business-day differences between markets. 
Additionally, we allow for time lags between price observations in order to test the assumption 
that the shock is not immediately transmitted from one market to the other. Our analysis of the 
financial turmoil surrounding the Asian crisis reveals that such corrections have an important 
bearing on the evidence for contagion, independent of the employed methodology. Using a 
correlation-based test, we find more contagion the faster we assume the shock to be 
transmitted. 
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I. Introduction 
During the last three decades, financial markets have experienced a large number of crises 
ranging from early crises such as the Latin American debt crisis in the mid 1980s, the US 
stock market crash in 1987, or the EMS crisis in 1992, to the Mexican crisis in 1994-5 and the 
Asian and Russian crises in 1997-8 and most recently to crises in Turkey in 2000-1, Argentina 
in 2001 and Brazil in 1999 and 2002. These crises have raised questions regarding the 
transmission of shocks from one national market to the next and the stability or shifts in these 
transmission channels during a crisis and thus triggered a discussion of the effects of and 
policy responses to international financial integration. Central to the discussion of crisis 
transmission channels is the distinction between interdependence and contagion: If crises are 
transmitted to interdependent countries through real and stable linkages such as export-import 
relations, then the spread of a crisis can be limited and countries with good economic 
fundamentals will be protected. On the other hand, if crises are contagious in the sense that 
speculative attacks, financial panic, or herd behavior are the transmission forces, then crises 
will spread further and national policy makers will face difficulties in protecting their markets 
from such a crisis.*  
Despite the substantial volume of academic evidence regarding contagion, it is difficult 
to draw a clear conclusion. The conceptual definitions of contagion differ and the empirical 
analyses are only partly comparable as methodologies, time periods and financial markets vary 
substantially across studies. More recently, however Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Dungey 
et al. (2005a, 2005b) have started to compare existing models and to provide a unified 
approach for contagion tests. Next to highlighting the differences and similarities of the 
                                                        
* See Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) for a detailed discussion regarding the definitions of contagion currently in use 
in the literature, the transmission channels of shocks, and an overview of the empirical evidence. 
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various methodologies, the latter authors also point out practical problems regarding contagion 
tests. One of these concerns is time zone alignment, which is needed when the actual trading 
hours differ across markets. In particular when testing for contagion in equity markets using 
correlation-based methodology, most studies employ synchronized data based on closing 
prices in two markets, which on a global time scale refer to different points in time. This 
difference is driven by differences in closing times of markets as well as by differences in time 
zones. Assuming for example that global financial markets are not fully and equally efficient, 
one can argue that shocks need time to be transmitted from one market to the other. This speed 
of transmission of shocks might well differ across markets. Thus, contagion studies using 
synchronized data make strong as well as differing assumptions about the speed of 
transmission of shocks. For example, the effective time difference of closing prices between 
Thailand and Taiwan is five hours, compared to only one hour between Thailand and 
Singapore. For the Asian crisis therefore, the assumed speed of transmission of shocks 
towards Singapore is five times faster than the assumed speed of transmission of shocks 
towards Taiwan. If such differences affect the conclusions regarding contagion versus 
interdependence, then the previously reported variations in results across countries might well 
be caused by the differences in the speed of transmission implicitly assumed when using 
synchronized data. Putting it differently, are the conclusions regarding contagion versus 
interdependence robust to changes in the assumed speed of transmission of shocks? 
Our study answers this question and proposes a new empirical solution which is 
applicable when closing times differ but trading hours overlap. As an improvement to the 
                                                        
 To remedy this problem, different methodological solutions have been proposed including moving average 
returns (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), lags (Bae et al., 2003), or dummy variables (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2003). 
 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting a focus on this research question.  
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rather simple moving average returns that Martens and Poon (2001) have shown to be 
inappropriate for the purpose of correlation estimation, Dungey et al. (2005b) propose a 
simulation approach, which is inspired by the work of Gourieroux et al. (1993). They first 
simulate high-frequency observations from the available discrete data for one market and then 
sample from this simulated data such that the observation coincides with an observed data-
point for the other market. The availability of high frequency data for equity markets allows us 
to sample from intra-day data directly thereby relying on observed rather than simulated 
market dynamics. We term our new approach time alignment of data.  More specifically, in a 
first step we generate pairwise exactly time-aligned stock market data by matching index 
values of different markets at the same point in time.§ In our terminology, an exact time-
alignment of data implies that shocks are immediately transmitted. However, such an infinitely 
high speed of transmission of shocks might not be the appropriate one that can be considered 
contagious. Therefore, we extend our analysis and allow for time differences between 
observations to account for a slower speed of transmission. Our results therefore demonstrate 
the sensitivity of the contagion-versus-interdependence conclusion to the assumed speed of 
transmission of shocks. 
For illustration, we apply our time-alignment-of-data approach to the Asian crisis of July 
1997. Whereas our new approach addresses a general problem in correlation studies, our 
findings serve as a robustness check of the work of King and Wadhwani (1990), Lee and Kim 
(1993), Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Baig and Goldfain (1999), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and 
Corsetti et al. (2005). We calculate conditional and unconditional correlation coefficients for 
15 countries during the episode of financial turmoil surrounding the Asian crisis. We compare 
                                                        
§ Among others, Martens and Poon (2001) refer to this as synchronous data. 
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results for synchronized data, exactly time-aligned data and time-aligned data that allow for a 
slower speed of transmission of shocks. Our results indicate that an assumed high speed of 
transmission of shocks favors contagion and a low speed of transmission favors 
interdependence. Consequently, existing contagion studies based on synchronized data do not 
allow proper cross-country comparisons and their results are not necessarily robust to changes 
in the assumed speed of transmission of shocks.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes the 
evidence and development of correlation-based contagion testing before introducing our set-up 
and deriving an alternative way of measuring contagion. Section III outlines the construction 
of the synchronized and time-aligned return data. In Section IV, we first discuss the 
correlation dynamics and contagion-versus-interdependence results from exactly time-aligned 
correlation coefficients in contrast to synchronized correlation coefficients. Second, we 
illustrate the sensitivity of the results to different speeds of transmission of shocks. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Correlation-based contagion tests 
Early studies of contagion apply simple unadjusted cross-market correlation coefficients, so-
called conditional correlation coefficients. In these studies, the findings overwhelmingly point 
in the direction of contagion. For instance, King and Wadhwani (1990) test for an increase in 
cross-market correlations between the US, UK and Japan and find that correlations increase 
significantly after the US stock market crash. Lee and Kim (1993) extend the analysis to 12 
major markets and find further evidence of contagion. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Baig 
and Goldfajn (1999) present evidence for contagion after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the 
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1997 Asian crisis. Cross-market correlations usually increased significantly during the crises 
period for many of the countries.  
 Forbes and Rigobon (2002), however, correctly realize that these conditional 
correlation coefficients overestimate the actual cross-market relationships in particular during 
periods of high volatility. They demonstrate that the presence of heteroskedasticity in market 
returns can have a significant impact on estimates of cross-market correlations. Therefore, if 
market volatility increases during crises, any test will overstate the magnitude of cross-market 
relationships. Thus these tests suggest that contagion occurs even if the underlying 
propagation mechanism is constant and shift-contagion does not occur. Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) use daily data for stock indices of 28 developed and emerging countries to test for 
evidence of contagion during the 1987 US stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican peso crisis 
and the 1997 Asian crisis. They show that correlation coefficients for multi-country returns are 
not significantly higher during crisis periods when changes in the variance of residuals are 
properly corrected. As a remedy for this overestimation problem, the authors thus propose the 
use of corrected unconditional correlation coefficients. Applying these to the three crisis 
periods reveals strong evidence of no contagion, only interdependence: The large cross-
market linkages after a shock are simply a continuation of strong transmission mechanisms 
that exist in more stable periods. In response to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Corsetti et al. 
(2005) demonstrate that the no contagion, only interdependence result can be attributed to 
arbitrary assumptions about the variance of the market-specific noise in the country where the 
crisis originated. These assumptions bias the test towards the null hypothesis of 
interdependence. For plausible values of the variance of country-specific shocks in Hong 
Kong, they find evidence of contagion to the stock markets in Singapore, the Philippines, 
France, Italy and the UK.  
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While addressing the issue of volatility changes correctly, these two studies adjust only 
inadequately for the time zone alignment problem as the moving average filter applied to 
closing prices may mask some of the movements in asset prices (see Dungey et al., 2005b). 
In contrast, our time-alignment-of-data approach provides an empirical solution based on the 
true underlying asset return dynamics without potentially introducing the problem of spurious 
dynamics into the relationship among market returns. More specifically, we calculate 
correlation coefficients based on exactly time-aligned as well as synchronized return data for 
15 countries in the period surrounding the Asian crisis. We are thus able to illustrate the 
consequences of both, the overestimation problem of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and the time 
zone alignment problem of Dungey et al. (2005b), as well as the speed of transmission 
problem. 
Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2005), we examine the 
relationship between returns in different markets by using a simple linear model: 
 
tj,ti,t εrβ  r +  =  (1)
 
where j denotes the ground-zero country in which the crisis originates  Thailand in our case  
and i denotes the country into which the crisis might  or might not  have spilled over.** 
Therefore, a significant change in the relationship between the returns, as given by a change in 
β, is evidence for contagion. Essentially, we are testing for a statistical change in the 
correlation coefficient ρi between the stock market returns of country i and ground-zero 
country j. For periods of high volatility, such as crisis periods, this implies first, that ρi will 
                                                        
** We also assume that the correlation between rj,t and εt is zero and that the variance of ε is a constant k. 
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increase as volatility increases and second, that ρi  will overestimate the actual correlation. To 
avoid this overestimation problem, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduce a simple correction: 
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where δ reflects the relative increase in the variance σj of ground-zero countrys return rj 
measured for two time periods, the high-volatility crisis period (h) and low-volatility stable 
period (l) as defined in equation (3): 
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Testing for contagion centers on the null-hypothesis of interdependence, which compares the 
correlation coefficient in the stable, low-volatility period ρil with the adjusted correlation 
coefficient in the high-volatility crisis period ρih*. In particular, we follow Corsetti et al. 
(2005) who assume that both correlation coefficients are based on return-samples drawn from 
independent bivariate normal distributions with the same true underlying correlation 
coefficient. Thus for the crisis as well as pre-crisis correlation coefficient, we can perform a 
Fisher z-transformation, which is in general defined as 
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Consequently, a standard two-sample t-test of the significance between the adjusted crisis 
correlation coefficient ρih* and the pre-crisis correlation coefficient ρil can be performed (e.g. 
see Dungey et al., 2005a).  
It is a well-known fact that the no contagion, only interdependence result of Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) is due to the poor size properties of their methodology. Among others, 
Dungey et al. (2005a, 2005b) show that the two-sample t-test is biased. Given that typically 
the pre-crisis sample is large and the crisis sample is small, this test has very little power. As a 
result, the ability of rejecting the null hypothesis is seriously affected by the sample size. In 
order to deal with this power and size problem, we extend our analysis in two different ways: 
Firstly, based on a Monte Carlo study, Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) confirm that 
with rapidly increasing standard errors associated with decreasing sample size the chances of 
rejecting the null hypothesis become vanishingly small. To overcome this power problem, 
they propose to increase the sample size of the crisis period. They find contagion in 6 out of 9 
cases for the longer crisis period. In contrast, they find no evidence of contagion for the short 
crisis period of Forbes and Rigobon due to the poor power properties of the test statistic. In 
line with Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001), we therefore consider a short but also a long 
crisis period. 
Secondly, despite the longer crisis period, the approach proposed in Dungey and 
Zhumabekova (2001) merely demonstrates the impact of the Fisher adjustment. However, by 
extending the crisis period we implicitly make the assumption that the crisis-period variance is 
constant over the longer period. Hence this approach is somewhat ad hoc and the issue of the 
critical values - on the tests of whether correlation has changed or not - has not been fully 
resolved. We overcome this problem by using a bootstrapping technique to construct the 
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critical values of the test (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1986; Efron, 1988) rather than assuming 
bivariate normality of the data. We sample pairs of market returns from the pre-crisis (nl) and 
the crisis sample (nh).  From this bootstrapped sample, we calculate a pre-crisis correlation ρil 
and a crisis correlation ρih before correcting the crisis correlation according to equation (2). 
Finally, we obtain a test statistic by calculating the difference between the adjusted crisis 
correlation ρi,m=1h* and pre-crisis correlation ρi,m=1l. We repeat the procedure 5000 times (m=1 
to 5000) and obtain our critical values for 1% and 5% from the histogram of test statistics. 
Consequently, a test of the significance between the adjusted crisis correlation coefficient and 
the pre-crisis correlation coefficient can be performed. We can reject the null-hypothesis of 
interdependence if the calculated value for [ρih*- ρil] is larger than the bootstrapped critical 
value.  
Whereas the use of an adjusted correlation coefficient addresses the overestimation 
problem and the use of a bootstrapping technique as well as the use a longer crisis period 
address the power and size problem, the potential bias introduced by the use of synchronized 
data has not been investigated yet. Thus, the existing studies make strong as well as differing 
assumptions about the speed of transmission of shocks due to differences in closing time 
and/or differences in time zones. If such differences affect the conclusions regarding 
contagion versus interdependence, then the previously reported variations in results across 
countries might well be caused by the differences in the assumed speed of transmission. We 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 We are again grateful to the referee for drawing our attention to this issue. 
 Notice that the standard test relies on bivariate normality of the data. The difference between the Fisher-
transformed correlations, z(ρih*) and z(ρil), is assumed to be normally distributed and we can reject the null-
hypothesis of interdependence if the calculated value for [z(ρih*)-z(ρil)] is larger than the critical value under 
normality. The parametric approach is known to result in somewhat wider confidence intervals than those 
obtained by our bootstrapping method (see e.g. Rasmussen, 1987). 
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therefore illustrate how robust the results are to changes in the assumed speed of transmission 
of shocks. 
 
III. Data 
To illustrate the effects of using time-aligned data, we apply our methodology to different 
phases of the Asian crisis of 1997. We define Thailands decision to float their currency on 
July 2, 1997 as the decisive event for this crisis. Consequently, Thailand constitutes our 
ground-zero country j from which the crisis potentially spilled over into other countries. We 
identify the low-volatility period as a pre-crisis period, which ranges from January 1, 1996 
until the day before the start of the crisis period. In particular, we consider two different 
phases of the Asian crisis. Whereas the Asian crisis started in the currency markets at the 
beginning of July 1997, its effects were not felt in the stock markets until the end of the 
month. Having increased sharply during the last week of June, the Thai stock market index 
remained between 600 and 700 during the month of July and revealed an overall positive 
trend. The market reached its peak on July 29 with a closing index of 679.2. However, during 
the period July 30 until September 2, the market lost nearly 28% of its value. Thus, we 
consider a first early crisis phase to range from July 30 to September 2. In the remainder of 
this paper we refer to this phase of the Asian crisis as the Thailand crisis. In addition, we 
consider a second, late crisis phase ranging from October 17 to November 16. Here we follow 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2005) who consider the importance of the 25% 
fall of Hong Kongs stock market during the Asian crisis. Consequently, we will refer to this 
phase of the Asian crisis as the Hong Kong crisis. For our ground-zero country Thailand, this 
second phase of the Asian crisis followed after the Thai stock market had stabilized somewhat 
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at an index level of 500 to 550 during September and October. During the months following 
October 17, however, the market lost another 17.5% in value finally closing the year at 372.69 
on December 31. For both, the Thailand crisis and the Hong Kong crisis, we take Dungey and 
Zhumabekovas (2001) criticism into account and extend our crisis periods to 2.5 months. For 
the Thailand crisis, we thus consider a second, extended crisis period ranging from July 30 to 
October 16, so as not to overlap with the subsequent Hong Kong crisis. For the Hong Kong 
crisis, we choose an equally long, extended crisis period from October 17 to December 30. 
Starting with Thailand as the ground-zero country, we select 10 Asian countries 
including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and China, four European countries including France, Germany, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom as well as Australia as potential candidates for contagion. Note that in order to 
investigate time-aligned correlations, we can only focus on stock markets for which trading 
hours overlap with the trading hours of the Thai market. This prerequisite excludes North and 
Latin American countries; countries, which are included in other contagion studies. 
For Australia and the Asian countries, we collect daily, local currency, closing prices 
of their major market index from DataStream. For the European countries, we collect 10 
oclock (UK time) prices of their major market index also from DataStream. For ground-zero 
country Thailand, tick-by-tick data for the Thai market index is purchased from The Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. Details for these series are given in Table 1. To create pairs of time-
aligned stock market returns between each of the 14 countries and Thailand, we first 
determine the exact time at which the national index is calculated. Since the Thai market is 
still open at the closing times of the Australian and Asian markets, a time-aligned price-match 
based on the local closing price can easily be found. Due to the large time-zone difference of 
at least six hours between Thailand and Europe, however, the Thai market is no longer open 
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when Europes markets are closing. We therefore revert to the use of stock market indices at 
10.00 oclock UK time provided by DataStream. In this process we are careful to allow for 
changes in national trading hours and thus the timing of the indexs closing price, for time 
zones and here i.e. national differences in the application of daylight saving time. The 
countries observing daylight saving time in our sample are the European countries and 
Australia (Sydney). Note that in autumn 1996 the rule of changing from standard time to 
daylight saving time changed. A new rule§§ is now valid for central Europe including the UK: 
On the last Sunday of March the standard time is changed to daylight saving time and on the 
last Sunday of October the time is changed back to standard time. In general, the time 
differences between the countries in our sample and Thailand are determined using the tz 
time zone database. The database contains code and data that represent the history of local 
time for many representative locations around the world. Most web pages or time zone 
conversion softwares are using this database. The exact date of change from standard time to 
daylight saving time was carefully verified with other time zone converters available on the 
web.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
IV. Empirical results 
Time alignment generates returns that are different from closing-price returns. Consequently, 
time-aligned correlations are different from synchronized correlations. As both, pre-crisis as 
well as crisis returns are different, it is difficult to predict how time-alignment affects the 
contagion-versus-interdependence conclusion. For the Thailand and Hong Kong crises, Tables 
                                                        
§§ The rule is a de facto standard, not a law. 
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2 and 3 report the synchronized correlations in Panel A and exactly time-aligned correlations 
in Panel B. For many countries, we confirm the findings of Martens and Poon (2001) that 
synchronized correlations are smaller than exactly time-aligned correlations.  During the 
Thailand crisis this is true for about 50% of our sample while during the Hong Kong crisis the 
percentage rises to 75%.  There are however many markets for which this is not the case. We 
therefore cannot simply postulate that the transmission of shocks is immediate and that exactly 
time-aligned correlations provide the true picture of a crisis. Instead we will later consider 
differences in the speed of transmission of shocks by modeling different degrees of time 
alignment with time differences ranging from zero to five, 30, 60, and 120 minutes.  
Furthermore, we can observe from Tables 2 and 3 that the increase in the correlations 
due to the time alignment of the data is generally stronger for the crisis periods, i.e. for the 
long crisis period. Note that the higher crisis correlations are relative to pre-crisis correlations, 
the more difficult it is to reject the null hypothesis of interdependence. As we find time-
aligned correlations to be especially high during crisis periods, we expect to find more 
contagion for the markets included in our study. The Fisher test as well as the bootstrapped 
method reflects this conjecture for the long but not for the short crisis period. Looking first at 
the results for the Thailand crisis in Table 2 reveals that synchronized correlations based on 
closing prices overwhelmingly indicate interdependence. Only for the case of Thailand versus 
Indonesia can contagion be found for the long crisis period.*** For exactly time-aligned data, 
the case for contagion is stronger. Though only one case of contagion can be found during the 
short crisis period, six cases of contagion are indicated during the long crisis period: For 
Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore the null hypothesis of 
                                                        
*** In general in Tables 2 and 3, the Fisher test and bootstrapped method lead to the same conclusion regarding 
contagion and interdependence and differ only in the level of significance. 
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interdependence can no longer be rejected. These findings of increased evidence of contagion 
during the long crisis period are in line with Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) and reflect the 
low power of the test in small samples, e.g. short crisis periods.  For the Hong Kong crisis a 
similar picture emerges in Table 3. However, there is some evidence for contagion when using 
synchronized data, i.e. for Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. In contrast, exactly time-aligned 
correlations indicate contagion during the long crisis period for Germany, Switzerland, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Comparing synchronized with exactly time-aligned 
results shows that various patterns are possible: Markets such as the Philippines or Taiwan 
that are considered contagious based on synchronized data, also show contagion from 
Thailand based on exactly time-aligned correlations. Markets such as Germany or Switzerland 
that are considered interdependent based on synchronized data, show contagion from Thailand 
based on exactly time-aligned correlations. However, a market such as Korea that shows 
contagion from Thailand during the short crisis period based on synchronized data, is 
considered interdependent based on exactly time-aligned correlations. This last pattern is 
however most likely due to the poor properties of the test for the short crisis period and we 
thus consider the first two patterns to be representative and dominant  at least for the 
countries and crises studied here. Furthermore, it is not generally true that exactly time-aligned 
correlations indicate contagion for markets with large time differences in closing times relative 
to Thailand. For the Thailand crisis phase, for example, no contagion was found for the 
European markets, which have the largest closing time differences. In sum, we conclude that 
synchronized data structurally favors interdependence. If the transmission of shocks is 
immediate and exactly time-aligned correlations reveal the true and correct set of results, there 
is more evidence for contagion than is so far believed. The under-identification of contagion 
for the synchronized results can however not be predicted based on closing time differences. 
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Since we do not know what speed of transmission between markets should be 
considered contagious, we generate results for differently time-aligned data. In particular, we 
assume a speed of transmission of five, 30, 60, and 120 minutes. The Fisher test statistic on 
which our contagion-versus-interdependence conclusion is based is reported in Table 4. 
Given the superior power properties of the test statistic for the long crisis period, we only 
report results for the long crisis periods. Panel A shows the results for the Thailand crisis. 
Dark (light) grey highlights indicate contagion, e.g. we can reject the null hypothesis of 
interdependence at the 1% (5%) level. Not highlighted Fisher test statistics indicate 
interdependence. For the Thailand crisis we find that some markets are interdependent with 
Thailand at all time alignments. These are the European markets, Korea, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and China. For the remaining markets, the evidence for contagion weakens as the 
assumed speed of transmission decreases. For the Hong Kong crisis, similar patterns can be 
found for some markets: France, the UK, Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore 
and China are always interdependent with Thailand. For Germany, Switzerland and Malaysia 
the evidence for contagion weakens as the assumed speed of transmission decreases. For the 
remaining markets, however, the Hong Kong crisis reveals new, non-linear patterns: Korea, 
the Philippines and Taiwan show evidence of contagion which is stable in the case of Korea, 
strongest for a 60-minute time alignment for the Philippines, and weakest for a 60-minute time 
alignment for Taiwan. In sum, we therefore have to conclude that (i) a higher assumed speed 
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of transmission generally leads to more evidence for contagion but (ii) this pattern is stronger 
for the Thailand crisis than for the Hong Kong crisis. A careful identification of the proper 
time-alignment is therefore essential before starting any study on crisis contagion or 
interdependence. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper presents a new empirical approach to overcome the problem of time zone 
alignment in correlation studies of financial contagion. Our new time-alignment-of-data 
approach allows us to test the impact of the speed of transmission on the contagion results. 
We generate pairwise exactly time-aligned stock market data by matching index values of 
different markets at the same point in time. In contrast to existing studies that use 
synchronized data such as Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2005), our method 
provides an empirical solution based on the true underlying asset return dynamics without 
potentially introducing the problem of spurious dynamics into the relationship among market 
returns. We apply our approach to the episodes of financial turmoil surrounding the Asian 
crisis and test for contagion based on exactly time-aligned as well as synchronized data for 15 
countries. Our results suggest that the fundamental difference in the data does ultimately affect 
the conclusions regarding contagion versus interdependence. Overall, using synchronized 
rather than exactly time-aligned correlations leads to an under-identification of contagion. 
Furthermore and more importantly, the contagion-versus-interdependency conclusion is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 When using the bootstrapped method, we find similar patterns that differ only in level of significance. Only in 
6 of 50 cases the null hypothesis can not be rejected when the bootstrapped method is used instead of the Fisher 
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indeed dependent on the assumed speed of transmission of shocks. In general, we show that a 
faster speed of transmission of shocks favors the contagion conclusion whereas a slower speed 
of transmission of shocks favors the interdependence conclusion.  Based on our findings for 
the long crisis periods using bootstrapped critical values, we reject Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002)s claim of no contagion, only interdependence. Given the differences in the time-
aligned versus synchronized results, our findings should caution researchers and practitioners 
alike when drawing conclusions based on synchronized data. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
test. In all other cases, the Fisher test and the bootstrapped method lead to the same conclusion. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample description 
 
Region Country Stock market index 
   
Time of index calculation 
(in local time) 
Closing time 
difference during 
crisis (in hours) 
Ground-zero Thailand  SET before 1/2/96 at 4.30 pm,  
   after 1/2/96 at 5.00 pm  
     
Europe France CAC40 5.00 pm (10.00 am UK) 5 or 6 
 Germany DAX30 5.00 pm (10.00 am UK) 5 or 6 
 Switzerland Swiss Market Index 5.00 pm (10.00 am UK) 5 or 6 
 UK FTSE100 4.00 pm (10.00 am UK) 5 or 6 
     
Australia Australia All Ordinaries 5.00 pm  Sydney time 3 or 4 
     
Asia Hong Kong  Hang Seng before 2/1/98 at 3.55 pm, 2 
   after 2/1/98 at 4.00 pm  
 Indonesia Jakarta SE Composite 4.00 pm 1 
 Japan Nikkei 500 3.00 pm 4 
 Korea KOSPI 200 3.00 pm 4 
 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite 5.00 pm 1 
 Philippines Philippines SE Composite before 2/19/02 at 2.00 pm, 4 
   after 2/19/02 at 2.30 pm  
 Singapore Singapore All Sing Equities 5.00 pm 1 
 Taiwan Taiwan SE Weighted before 4/4/98 at 12.00 pm, 5 
   after 4/4/98 at 1.30 pm  
 China Shanghai SE Composite 4.00 pm 2 
     
Notes: This table reports all countries included in our analysis, the stock market index chosen to represent the 
countrys stock market and the local time when the index is calculated. Dates are given as month/day/year. SE is the 
abbreviation for stock exchange. Multiple closing times during the crisis period for European and Australian markets are 
due different rules regarding daylight saving time before and after October 24, 2007.  For time-aligned analysis only.  
For synchronized analysis only. 
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TABLE 2 
Contagion versus interdependence during the Thailand crisis 
 
 Pre-crisis  
 period  
 
Short crisis period 
 
Long crisis period 
Country i ρil  ρih* Contagion ρih* Contagion 
    Fisher test Boot- 
strapped 
 Fisher test  Boot- 
strapped 
Panel A: Synchronized data using closing prices 
France 0.0338 0.3041    I I 0.2019 I I 
Germany 0.0469 0.1939    I I 0.1265 I I 
Switzerland 0.0540 0.2632    I I 0.1397 I I 
UK 0.0604 0.2473    I I 0.0512 I I 
Australia 0.0734 -0.0822    I I 0.1437 I I 
Hong Kong 0.1017 0.1885    I I 0.1460 I I 
Indonesia 0.1369 0.3990    I I 0.4465 C** C* 
Japan 0.0147 0.3509    I I 0.2242 I I 
Korea 0.0137 0.1638    I I 0.0036 I I 
Malaysia 0.0943 0.0783    I I 0.2719 I I 
Philippines -0.0188 0.1528    I I 0.1494 I I 
Singapore 0.1607 0.1023    I I 0.2855 I I 
Taiwan 0.0320 -0.1726    I I -0.1865 I I 
China 0.0395 -0.0598    I I 0.0010 I I 
Panel B: Exactly time-aligned data using matched intra-day prices 
France 0.0969 0.1294 I I 0.0778 I I 
Germany 0.0678 0.1596 I I 0.1010 I I 
Switzerland 0.0857 0.1812 I I 0.1205 I I 
UK 0.1492 0.1848 I I 0.0143 I I 
Australia 0.1211 0.0101 I I 0.2525 C* C* 
Hong Kong 0.1582 0.1950 I I 0.3475 C* C* 
Indonesia 0.1647 0.5111 C* C* 0.5170 C** C* 
Japan 0.0919 0.0973 I I 0.2247 C* C* 
Korea 0.0127 -0.0307 I I -0.1172 I I 
Malaysia 0.0978 0.0763 I I 0.3172 C* C* 
Philippines 0.0758 0.1615 I I 0.1766 I I 
Singapore 0.1460 0.0828 I I 0.3386 C* C* 
Taiwan 0.1167 -0.1459 I I -0.1140 I I 
China 0.0179 -0.0178 I I -0.0098 I I 
Notes: For each country in our sample, columns 2, 3 and 6 report the pre-crisis correlation coefficients ρil and 
the adjusted crisis correlation coefficients ρih* of that countrys stock market index with the Thailand index, 
respectively. In columns 4 and 7 a C is reported when the Fisher 2-sample t-test statistic indicates contagion and an I 
is reported when this test indicates interdependence. In columns 5 and 8 a C is reported when the bootstrapped 
method indicates contagion and an I is reported when this method indicates interdependence. Confidences levels are 
indicated with * for the 5% confidence level and ** for the 1% confidence level. The pre-crisis period ranges from 
January 4, 1996 to July 29, 1997, the short crisis period ranges from July 30, 1997 to September 2, 1997 and the 
long crisis period ranges from July 30, 1997 to October 16, 1997. 
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TABLE 3 
Contagion versus interdependence during the Hong Kong crisis 
 Pre-crisis  
 period  
 
Short crisis period 
 
Long crisis period 
Country i ρil  ρih* Contagion ρih* Contagion 
    Fisher test Boot-
strapped 
 Fisher test Boot-
strapped 
Panel A: Synchronized data using closing prices 
France 0.0720 0.0453 I I 0.1112 I I 
Germany 0.0714 0.0729 I I 0.1429 I I 
Switzerland 0.0795 0.0476 I I 0.1018 I I 
UK 0.0588 -0.0125 I I 0.1125 I I 
Australia 0.0902 0.2062 I I 0.2427 I I 
Hong Kong 0.1201 -0.0024 I I 0.0890 I I 
Indonesia 0.2409 0.1058 I I 0.2418 I I 
Japan 0.0648 -0.0275 I I 0.0551 I I 
Korea 0.0161 0.4287 C* C* 0.4668 C** C** 
Malaysia 0.1573 0.2022 I I 0.3504 I I 
Philippines 0.0327 0.2232 I I 0.3511 C* C* 
Singapore 0.1987 0.1419 I I 0.2213 I I 
Taiwan -0.0006 0.2074 I I 0.2535 C* C* 
China 0.0362 0.2018 I I 0.1772 I I 
Panel B: Exactly time-aligned data using matched intra-day prices 
France 0.0971 0.1772 I I 0.2032 I I 
Germany 0.0809 0.2013 I I 0.2408 C* C* 
Switzerland 0.0982 0.2019 I I 0.2459 C* C* 
UK 0.1209 0.1572 I I 0.2241 I I 
Australia 0.1494 0.2064 I I 0.2158 I I 
Hong Kong 0.1948 0.0196 I I 0.0797 I I 
Indonesia 0.2744 0.1100 I I 0.2478 I I 
Japan 0.1266 0.0069 I I 0.0778 I I 
Korea -0.0064 0.2815 I I 0.3589 C** C* 
Malaysia 0.1714 0.1867 I I 0.3909 C* C* 
Philippines 0.1097 0.1319 I I 0.3295 C* C* 
Singapore 0.1985 0.1618 I I 0.2384 I I 
Taiwan 0.0828 0.2942 I I 0.2652 C* C* 
China 0.0155 0.2358 I I 0.1546 I I 
Notes: For each country in our sample, columns 2, 3 and 6 report the pre-crisis correlation coefficients ρil and 
the adjusted crisis correlation coefficients ρih* of that countrys stock market index with the Thailand index, 
respectively. In columns 4 and 7 a C is reported when the Fisher 2-sample t-test statistic indicates contagion and an I 
is reported when this test indicates interdependence. In columns 5 and 8 a C is reported when the bootstrapped 
method indicates contagion and an I is reported when this method indicates interdependence. Confidences levels are 
indicated with * for the 5% confidence level and ** for the 1% confidence level. The pre-crisis period ranges from 
January 4, 1996 to October 16, 1997, the short crisis period ranges from October 17, 1997 to November 16, 1997 
and the long crisis period ranges from October 17, 1997 to December 30, 1997. 
.. 
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TABLE 4 
Sensitivity of the contagion results to the timing of the data 
Fisher test for differently time-aligned data 
(time difference between observations in minutes) 
Country i 0 5 30 60 120 
Fisher test 
for synchro- 
nized data 
Panel A: Thailand crisis 
France -0.1315 -0.1569 -0.2492 -0.3549 0.2109 1.1669 
Germany 0.2281 0.2014 -0.1184 -0.2279 0.7395 0.5482 
Switzerland 0.2400 0.2312 0.1885 0.1655 0.7313 0.5915 
UK -0.9296 -0.9981 -0.8202 -0.7058 0.0764 -0.0636 
Australia 1.7331 1.8596 1.9456 1.7014 0.7097 0.4870 
Hong Kong 1.6876 1.7294 1.9455 2.4211 1.0714 0.3080 
Indonesia 2.7782 2.4522 2.2240 1.9547 1.6811 2.3440 
Japan 1.9335 1.9216 2.1196 1.7891 0.7261 1.4602 
Korea -0.8926 -0.6836 -0.4223 -0.3450 -0.1826 -0.0695 
Malaysia 1.7751 1.7890 1.9626 1.6695 0.4716 1.2614 
Philippines 0.7017 -0.5397 -0.0607 1.5828 1.2828 1.1587 
Singapore 1.9063 2.0499 1.7370 1.5423 1.5147 0.9005 
Taiwan -1.5856 -1.0761 -0.4714 -0.4030 -0.8030 -1.5108 
China -0.1891 0.1164 0.3577 0.5331 0.7563 -0.2636 
Panel B: Hong Kong crisis 
France 0.7012 0.6716 0.6215 0.8869 0.2497 0.2550 
Germany 1.9728 1.9510 2.0482 1.7414 0.5215 0.4721 
Switzerland 1.8995 1.9396 2.2015 1.9387 0.5433 0.1465 
UK 0.6942 0.6432 0.6596 0.5869 0.3264 0.3534 
Australia 0.4571 0.5450 0.5765 0.3788 0.7519 1.0459 
Hong Kong -0.7746 -0.7986 -0.7449 -0.8398 -0.6373 -0.2076 
Indonesia -0.1901 -0.1641 -0.3980 -0.5223 -0.5227 0.0064 
Japan -0.3277 -0.3144 -0.3386 -0.1476 0.439 -0.0647 
Korea 2.5418 2.6440 2.4494 2.0919 2.3917 3.2590 
Malaysia 1.8946 1.7465 1.9979 1.6869 1.4475 1.5096 
Philippines 1.8442 1.7348 1.9721 2.3556 2.1897 2.2215 
Singapore 0.2790 0.2175 0.1334 0.5557 1.1096 0.1570 
Taiwan 1.7553 1.8569 1.9214 1.6959 1.7695 1.9279 
China 0.9252 0.8713 0.9502 0.9273 0.7870 0.9417 
Notes: The table presents the contagion results for differently time-aligned data. We test for different possible speed of 
transmission of shocks. The assumption is that the appropriate alignment might be contemporaneous (0 minutes), within 5, 30, 
60 or 120 minutes. Additionally, the results for closing prices are presented. We report the Fisher 2-sample t-test statistic 
applied to test the null hypothesis of interdependence. The test statistic is highlighted when the null hypothesis is rejected, e.g. 
in case of contagion. Confidences levels are indicated in light grey for the 5% level and dark grey for the 1% level. In Panel A 
for the Thailand crisis, the pre-crisis period ranges from January 4, 1996 to July 29, 1997 and the long crisis period ranges 
from July 30, 1997 to October 16, 1997. In Panel B for the Hong Kong crisis, the pre-crisis period ranges from January 4, 1996 
to October 16, 1997 and the long crisis period ranges from October 17, 1997 to December 30, 1997.  Interdependence cannot 
be rejected when the bootstrapped method is used to obtain critical values. In all other cases, the Fisher test and the 
bootstrapped method lead to the same conclusion. 
 
